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Non-Technical Summary
This paper analyses the efficiency of Italy’s local electricity distributors according to two
different measurement techniques. Distribution zones belonging to the national monopolist
(ENEL) are compared with municipally-owned utilities (MUNIs) which serve individual
towns and are usually owned by City Councils (with a few of them currently undergoing
privatisation). ENEL-MUNI comparisons are displayed subject to a number of caveats, and
statistical techniques are used in order to cross-check the results stemming from different
methodologies.
The paper’s main finding is that comparative efficiency analysis failed to spot any
systematic efficiency superiority of ENEL’s local units over municipal utilities. Overall
efficiency comparison outcomes were mixed, thus suggesting that a case-by-case approach
should be adopted by Italy’s regulatory and governmental authorities when dealing with the
territorial reform of electricity distribution. Similarly, any ownership transfers and/or mergers
involving ENEL’s units and MUNIs should depend on the varied efficiency records which
were detected according to different regional and economic scenarios.3
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1. Introduction
This paper analyses technical efficiency of local electricity distribution in Italy (1994,
1996) by using both econometric (deterministic frontier, stochastic frontier) and linear
programming (Data Envelopment Analysis) tools. Cross-sectional data were examined with
respect to
(a) ENEL - the Italian electricity monopolist whose restructuring and privatisation is
now under way - and its local distribution branches;
(b) municipal authorities (MUNIs), i.e. town-based electric utilities which sometimes
hold franchises for electricity distribution within city limits.
Estimation results highlighted non-exhaustion of scale economies at sample-mean
values. Efficiency score series stemming from both econometric and linear programming
techniques showed that Southern distributors were relatively under-represented among top
units even after allowing for several exogenous environmental variables. The external effects
which proved to influence technical efficiency in electricity distribution were consumer
density, the percentage of industrial customers, the geographical nature of areas served
(metropolitan areas, mountains, etc.), and the interaction between ENEL’s units and
municipal utilities in those towns featuring ENEL and MUNIs bordering each other.
Pooled ENEL-MUNI analysis failed to spot any systematic superiority of ENEL’s units
over municipalities. Generalisation on the ENEL-MUNI efficiency dispute was then
discarded, in favour of case-by-case comparison. Paired-samples statistical testing (both
parametric and non-parametric) showed limited agreement between Stochastic Frontier
Estimation (SFE) and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) efficiency outcomes. Statistical
concordance was more often found when comparing SFE and DEA models sharing the same
input-output specification. Again, no apparent superiority of ENEL over MUNIs was detected
by DEA linear programs. One-to-one comparisons confirmed that the outcomes were mixed,
with ENEL’s local branches outperforming MUNIs in metropolitan and (sometimes) rural
areas, and MUNIs faring better in medium-sized, Po Valley towns (Northern Italy). Results
were not clear-cut for Alpine and rural distributors. The latter - however - should be
considered on a separate basis in that they will probably need permanent subsidies to meet
universal service obligations, irrespective of the future structure of electricity distribution in
Italy. Comparable (e.g., urban) units might - on the other hand - be subject to yardstick
regulation based upon DEA’s ‘efficient peer’ outcomes.
 2. Stochastic Frontier Estimation
This Section is concerned with the efficiency analysis of Italy’s local distributors (ENEL)
in 1996. As clarified later on, stochastic frontier methods are able to separate inefficiency
effects from random noise/measurement error, by assuming specific statistical distribution
functions for the random disturbance term. Modern computer packages are also able to
calculate - in addition to standard numerical estimates - some interesting efficiency rankings
of firms in the sample. Such rankings, albeit elegant and easy to use for policy-making
purposes, strongly depend upon the variables which are chosen as cost determinants by the
econometrician. We shall show how efficiency outcomes are sensitive to model specification
issues by running alternative regressions featuring different environmental variables. In
particular, the purpose of this Section is to highlight to what extent Southern local electricity
units are really less efficient than their Northern counterparts. The analysis will allow for
those external variables which are generally regarded as ‘peculiar exogenous features’, thus11
where COSTMTBT is total cost of capital at each zone (constructed as the sum of costs
relating to both medium-voltage and low-voltage plants) and LINES is the length of
distribution networks (in kilometres), again including both medium-voltage and low-voltage
lines, plus some high-voltage connections being used by local units in order to reinforce the
network11;
(d) price of materials (pm), being computed as the ratio between total cost of third-party
deliveries and the number of transformers. Such proxy variable is aimed at capturing the
effect of external inputs on total distribution cost. Since materials are generally included in
third-party works by ENEL, we used those costs as the numerator for our proxy price.
Moreover, as materials are especially used in specific plants such as substations and
capacitors, we expressed the materials price in terms of transforming units (substations).
Therefore,
p THIRDPT TRANS m = / .
Materials will be used as a residual input in the cost function. Total cost normalisation -
to be imposed in order to deal with degree-one homogeneity in input prices – has been
usefully carried out by using materials as the ‘numeraire’ input;
(e) traditional output (Y), being viewed as total GWh12 delivered to final customers by
each local distributor in 1996. It includes energy sold to industrial customers, to publicly-
owned enterprises such as Ferrovie dello Stato (Italian Railways), and to residential users in
both urban and rural contexts;
(f) following Neuberg (1977), it should be noticed that energy delivered to final
customers is not always really exogenous. With special reference to non-regulated public
utilities such as Italian ones, exogeneity of output might be dubious, in the light of
considerable freedom being conferred upon ENEL in planning its output deliveries. In other
words, differently from American-style utilities, ENEL is not compelled by the regulator to
provide its customers with whatever quantities they desire at given (regulated) prices.
Therefore, an alternative definition of output which should be really exogenous to the utility
is the one considering total customers (CUST). Since total customers cannot be controlled by
utilities as everybody has the statutory right to buy electricity from the national operator13, the
‘total customers’ variable has been successfully used in the recent literature14 as a really
exogenous proxy for output. We thus introduce total customers as a second definition of
output within our multiple input-multiple output translog total cost function.
Apart from the standard input-price and output measures to be inserted in the translog
cost function15, a number of ‘environmental’ variables were also specified, in order to capture
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external factors which might influence the efficiency performance of local ENEL zones, while
being not directly controllable by the single decision-making unit (DMU). These
environmental variables, or ‘external cost drivers’, are listed below:
(i) customer density (DENS), expressed as the ratio between total customers and areas
served by each local distributor within ENEL. This should capture the effect of demographic
features on electricity distribution costs;
(ii) percentage of energy delivered to industrial customers (INDY) on total energy
deliveries: this aims at capturing the (positive) effect of more industrialised environments on
local distribution costs;
(iii) percentage of third-party services - in terms of ‘live’ costs incurred by the utility - on
total distribution cost (THIRD): this is a way of testing the statement that ‘buy’ might be better
than ‘make’ for some rural ENEL zones, and the expected effect of this variable is uncertain;
(iv) percentage of industrial customers on total customers (INDCUS), which is the
counterpart of INDY when ‘total customers’ is assumed to be a proxy for output, and should
have a positive effect on efficiency;
(v) percentage of medium-voltage lines on total lines (INDLIN): this is a proxy for the
percentage of lines being directed to industrial customers on total kilometres of line, and
should also indicate that industrial areas exogenously boost efficiency performances;
(vi) percentage of overhead medium-voltage lines on total medium-voltage lines
(AIRMT). This should capture the effect on costs of building overhead systems instead of
underground cables, the ex ante assumption being that the former should be less costly;
(vii) percentage of overhead low-voltage lines on total low-voltage lines (AIRBT), where
the ex ante assumption is reversed. That is, overhead cables for low-voltage deliveries to
residential customers - especially within crowded urban contexts - should be more expensive
than conventional underground low-voltage wires;
(viii) percentage of primary substations on total transforming substations (PTP). Primary
substations are those carrying out the first and most important transformation task, by scaling
down electricity voltage from high (transmission) to medium. More powerful primary
substations tend to minimise electricity losses (ceteris paribus), even though such stations
might have a negative effect upon short-run technical efficiency because they constitute an
additional burden in terms of capital assets within a short-term setting;
(ix) a series of dummy variables capturing other environmental effects: landscape
features (MOUNTD = 1 if the local zone is made up of more than 50% mountains higher than
700m, capturing the expected cost disadvantage of mountain distribution; SEAD = 1 if the
zone includes coastal areas, capturing higher operating and maintenance costs stemming
from the peculiar nature and weather of most Italian coastline districts), geographical
peculiarities (SOUD = 1 if the distribution zone is located in Southern Italy, which is
commonly perceived as an efficiency handicap; METRD = 1 if the zone is serving a
‘metropolitan area’, according to Italy’s Law no. 142/199016, which might have either positive
or negative effects on efficiency; BORD = 1 if the zone is on Italy’s political borderline, which
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might capture either positive or negative externalities coming from interconnected
neighbouring countries), and other technical-economic characteristics (INDUSD = 1 if the
zone is located within an industrial district, which might show co-linearity with other
variables introduced before, and have similar effects on efficiency; MUNID = 1 if the zone is
either in the neighbourhood of, or perhaps surrounds, a municipal distributor to which
expensive connection has to be granted, thus affecting the zone’s technical performance in a
negative fashion; finally, GEND = 1 if the zone also includes some generating plants, whose
costs might be partially passed through by ENEL onto distributing branches, thus
jeopardising their technical efficiency record due to mere accounting tricks).
The above variables should be carefully assessed until a final model - including a strict
subset of them - is accepted as the closest approximation to the ‘true’ model.
Before concluding this discussion, we would like to introduce some variables to be used
in a following analysis featuring a pooled 1994-1996 sample of both ENEL’s local zones and
municipally-owned electricity distributors. Whereas the main sample was made up of 147
ENEL distribution zones for the financial year 1996, we only managed to get a 1994 cross-
section of 37 municipal utilities running electricity distribution (as a separate business) among
their activities. Moreover, we were not able to obtain data on costs. Differently from ENEL,
municipally-owned distributors are not compelled to deliver their ‘regulatory accounts’ to the
electricity regulator (AEG, or Autorità per l’Energia Elettrica ed il Gas). Therefore, we only
obtained production figures on municipalities. The input-output data which were collected
are to be used within a dual production function setting.
We decided to pool the two samples, in spite of their different dates, because no
significant technical progress seemed to have occurred for Italian electricity distribution from
1994 to 199617. Furthermore, inflation issues are ruled out a priori since input-output data only
will be used in the pooled regression, with no monetary values involved. Even though
technical progress might have been present to some extent in distribution technology, this
would simply increase the robustness of our results, which - as shown later on - are
sometimes in strong agreement with the view that some municipal distributors, especially in
medium-sized towns and in Lombardy, show higher efficiency levels than their surrounding
ENEL-run electricity distribution zones do.
The production values which were collected for the 37 municipal distributors at 31
December 1994 are as follows:
(a) traditional output definition (Y = GWh delivered to final customers);
(b) alternative definition of output, as CUST (number of customers);
(c) capital values: kilometres of distribution line, all voltages (LINES); number of
transforming plants (substations), both primary and secondary (TRANS);
(d) labour values: number of full-time equivalent employees at 31.12.1994 (N = end-year
average);
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(Constant) 34.89948 1.01000 34.60205
pl 0.56502 0.28785 1.96287
pl2 -0.51774 0.19900 -2.59764
pk 0.82507 0.39432 2.09387
pk2 -0.49249 0.17600 -2.79739
Y 3.01455 0.98800 3.05093
Y2 0.10035 0.05278 1.90137
CUST 7.17963 0.61400 11.68960
CUST2 0.33661 0.08100 4.15749
plpk 0.97712 0.35500 2.75266
Ypk 0.30703 0.20200 1.51675
pk (CUST) -0.44321 0.19100 -2.32533
Ypl -0.22636 0.20700 -1.09563
pl (CUST) 0.39444 0.18800 2.09511








DENS -0.154229 0.039900 -3.866100
INDY -0.184793 0.094196 -1.961780
THIRD -0.284339 0.050200 -5.660420
AIRBT 0.094981 0.029200 3.253540
PTP 0.055148 0.022100 2.496420
SOUD -0.074541 0.065700 -1.135150
MOUNTD -0.003534 0.084300 -0.041950
METRD 0.193281 0.372000 0.519890
MUNID 0.172778 0.075800 2.280120
SEAD -0.072725 0.069800 -1.041940
BORD -0.189787 0.139000 -1.363830
INDUSD 0.023613 0.069400 0.340150
s s-squared 0.031803 0.00521 6.104223
Gamma (Grid Search) 0.0198 0.0103 1.9223301
Log-Likelihood Function 52.469
LR Test of the One-Sided Error19 17.659
No. of Iterations 55/100
Sample Size 147
Time Periods 1
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(c) third-party works were also beneficial to cost: this is perhaps a suggestion to
ENEL’s zones in favour of ‘buying’ external services rather than ‘making’ them internally20;
(d) overhead cables in low-voltage distribution are more expensive than standard
underground connections;
(e) primary (PTP) substations raise distribution cost, but are needed in large numbers
for system security reasons, and for minimisation of electricity losses throughout the
distribution system;
(f) the territorial North-South dummy (SOUD) was not statistically significant, and its
coefficient had the ‘wrong’ sign. Therefore, no systematic ‘Southern effects’ were spotted by
the stochastic frontier model;
(g) both landscape effects (MOUNTD) and metropolitan areas (METRD) were found to
be statistically insignificant with respect to total cost minimisation;
(h) the presence of municipal distributors at zonal borders was discovered to rise
distribution cost. This is probably due to urban ‘cream-skimming’21 being performed by those
municipalities which serve city centres, by connecting to ENEL’s access points at city
outskirts. This obviously involves connection costs to ENEL, which are probably reflected by
the positive sign of MUNID’s coefficient;
(i) finally, all coefficients for SEAD, BORD, and INDUSD turned out to be
insignificant, meaning that the presence of either the sea or national borders as geographical
limits to ENEL’s zones did not significantly influence distribution cost. Industrial districts
were found to be irrelevant as well; however, industrial output showed the ‘right’ sign with
statistical significance. It should also be recalled that the GEND dummy for generation had
been excluded from the model at the outset, after showing severe insignificance in a
preliminary run. This confirms the view according to which location of generating units may
perhaps influence transmission and vice versa - with distribution being left unaffected,
though.
Efficiency rankings for ENEL’s 147 local zones are available by writing to the author22.
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3. Stochastic Frontier Analysis of ENEL’s Zones and MUNIs: Comparative Rankings
From a Pooled Cross-Sectional Sample (1994-1996)
We built up a 1994-1996 pooled sample made up of 39 ENEL’s zones (‘peers’) and 37
MUNIs. When analysing the pooled sample, we chose to keep the translog production
function’s specification as parsimonious as possible, in view of the following considerations:
(a) by construction, the pooled sample showed strong similarity between MUNIs and
ENEL’s peers, which allowed us to save on environmental effects, thus gaining several
degrees of freedom for estimation. Peculiar cost drivers are in fact useful whenever
structurally different firms (for example, those belonging to Northern and Southern regions)
make up the sample. However, if the sample is intentionally calibrated so as to include similar
firms only, the number of environmental (Z) effects may be substantially cut down, in order
to estimate a lighter specification;
(b) data homogenisation problems forced us to drop some environmental effects for
which we had no complete figures (e.g., simultaneous maximum demand, industrial lines,
industrial customers, percentage of PTP transformers, and so on);
(c) ‘smoothing’ of rankings is also an issue to be worth investigating: by considering
relevant external effects only, we limited overlapping rankings, while keeping model
specification parsimonious enough according to a general-to-simple methodology;
(d) insignificance of most environmental effects when examining the homogeneous
pooled sample (instead of the slightly inconsistent ENEL or MUNI one) pushed us to refine
the model from a purely statistical point of view, so as to reach for a very light specification,
including three environmental variables only23.
We estimated a 3-effects stochastic translog production model being based on a sample
of 76 pooled observations for 37 municipal utilities (business year 1994) and 39 ENEL’s ‘peers’
(business year 1996), which were selected according to both geographical and economic
criteria. As a rule, all ‘twins’ - i.e., ENEL zones relating to the same town as MUNIs - were
inserted as peers, plus ‘proxy twins’ being chosen among the nearest ENEL units and/or
those provincial units which most resembled - in both economic and environmental terms -
the MUNI they were coupled with. We also tried to run the same stochastic regression on a
non-restricted, 184-observation sample (made up of all the 147 zones from ENEL, plus 37
MUNIs), with negligible outcomes. These were attributed to heterogeneity of most ENEL
zones as opposed to the 37 MUNIs, which originated considerable interference with the
relevant comparisons to be made. After realising that the MUNIs should have been compared
to some ‘twins’ (or ‘peers’) only, we non-randomly selected 39 ENEL units, so as to go for the
‘calibrated pooled sample’ mentioned above. Such a sample is obviously homogeneous by
construction.
To sum up, after excluding irrelevant external effects and selecting the 76-observation
pooled sample as the ‘right’ one, we fitted the following stochastic translog TEE production
model (named SFM3, three effects):
                                                     
23 Notice that this strictly relates to the homogeneity issue, as a result of ENEL’s peers being chosen by
construction. Consequently, sample selection itself tends to invalidate statistical significance of most initial
external effects, thus confirming the basic argument sub (a).23
relationship with maximum demand in each area, and - therefore - with ENEL’s locational
choices concerning generating units. Finally, as regards MUNIs, the generation/output
relationship is even deeper, because several municipal distributors own their dedicated
power stations in order to minimise dependence on ENEL’s supplies24 and maximise system
security. Since both metropolitan distributors and those holding franchises for medium-sized
Northern towns are the biggest auto-generators, the positive effect of GEND upon Y is further
explained, and GEND’s coefficient turns out to be fully justified.
With reference to the MUNID dummy, it must be noticed that its positive relationship
with delivered output should be interpreted in the light of MUNID’s new definition within
the current, ‘pooled’ analysis. Because of the presence of MUNIs together with ENEL zones in
the sample, MUNID has been redefined in such a way to be worth one for each MUNI, and
zero otherwise. Positive correlation between the ‘new’ MUNID and delivered output might
then be simply due to the fact that some municipal utilities are very large (metropolitan
distributors, and urban ones).
An appropriate analysis would entail direct comparisons between MUNIs and their
peers. The following Table accomplishes this task by displaying the ‘winner’ (MUNI/ENEL)
for each single comparison.
Table 3: MUNIs and their ENEL Peers (SFM3): Winners/Losers






Verona VERONA NORD, VERONA SUD ENEL
Vicenza VICENZA ENEL
Rovereto SALO', TRENTO ENEL
Tolentino MACERATA ENEL
Primiero TRENTO ENEL
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Brunico BOLZANO MUNI










Voghera VIGEVANO, LODI ENEL
Bressanone BOLZANO ENEL
Trani MONOPOLI MUNI




Rep.S.Mar. RIMINI, PESARO ENEL
Riva d/G SALO', TRENTO ENEL
Osimo ANCONA ENEL
Sondrio SONDRIO MUNI
Levico T. TRENTO ENEL
Soresina CREMONA, LODI MUNI
Tirano SONDRIO, LECCO MUNI
Gattinara VERCELLI, BIELLA, VERBANIA MUNI
Mezzolomb. TRENTO ENEL
Selvino BERGAMO EXT., BRENO MUNI
Vigo d/C BELLUNO, BASSANO MUNI25
It is clear from the Table above that 13 out of 37 MUNIs outperformed their ENEL
comparators. This entails that more than 35% of MUNIs were relatively more efficient - in
technical terms - than their surrounding/neighbouring ENEL zones. This may not seem to be
an exciting outcome for MUNIs in general, thus crediting the view according to which
ENEL’s zones are, on average, more efficient than municipalities. However, if urban areas
only are allowed for - thus excluding mountain villages in the Trentino/South Tyrol region -
the percentage of municipalities which were found to be relatively more efficient jumps to
46.15%. Apart from metropolitan areas - where ENEL turned out to outperform MUNIs
dramatically (Rome, Milan, Turin) - smaller towns in the North and Centre of Italy had their
MUNI as the relative efficiency winner against the surrounding ENEL zone (Trieste, Parma,
Terni, Cremona, Vercelli, Sondrio). Moreover, when one restricts the efficiency comparison to
Lombardy’s MUNIs only, the percentage of winner MUNIs reaches 55.6%. In particular,
several urban and suburban distributors in the Milanese region outperformed their ENEL
peers (Cremona, Sondrio, Soresina, Tirano, Selvino).
A final word should be spent on ENEL’s dominance over MUNIs in the main
metropolitan contexts, and on Trani’s successful comparison   its closest ENEL peer
(Monopoli). As regards metropolitan comparisons, the insertion of only three environmental
effects does not suffice to claim excessive ‘punishment’ for city centres (which are served by
MUNIs). Since our pooled analysis is almost a ‘naked’ one (when it comes to external
variables), comparisons are crude. Therefore, MUNIs in Milan, Turin, and Rome were simply
outperformed by surrounding ENEL zones. This may be partially due to the fact that
efficiency was measured in production (not in cost) terms. Since medium-sized towns in the
North and Centre of Italy were better managed by MUNIs, one suspects that municipal
distribution technology satisfactorily suits provincial towns, although it is ‘defeated’ in
metropolitan areas. This consideration is strengthened by the fact that some smaller MUNIs
(Brunico, Trani, Soresina, Tirano, Gattinara, Selvino, Vigo di Cadore) managed to outscore
their ENEL peers within either rural or mountain contexts.
It then appears that, as Pollitt (1995) suggested, different companies enjoy different
technologies, which cannot be constrained within any particular functional form, because
they are tailored to different environmental contexts. For instance, according to our results, it
seems that municipal distributing technology does better in smaller towns - despite the scale
economies issue - whereas ENEL’s performance is definitely higher within metropolitan
areas. However, because of small sample problems, one cannot seriously make authoritative
inference on this. Furthermore, if one believed that ENEL zones and MUNIs have different
technologies in electricity distribution, constraining their production functions to be the same
across the whole pooled sample would simply be wrong in the first place. It would be much
wiser to suspend our judgement on relative efficiency in metropolitan contexts until a non-
parametric technique is introduced, in order to cross-check our comparative results against a
‘distribution-free’ approach25 which does not force production relationships to have a
particular functional form (even though as general as the translog).
To conclude, it is worth noticing that the only Southern MUNI in the sample (Trani,
Apulia) outperformed its ENEL peer (Monopoli). This is obviously not enough to predict any
municipal superiority over ENEL in the South, simply because electric municipalities from
Southern Italy are non-existent. However, this outcome per se is interesting, as it shows that
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model specification problems (at some cost).26
the only Southern municipality26 not only fared better than its ENEL comparator (66.4%
against 66.3% technical efficiency, a negligible difference) but - what’s more important - also
managed to join the first efficiency group (1-38), thus locating its efficiency score at a higher
level than the average one (66.4% vs. 61.9%). In ranking terms, Trani’s MUNI stands at
number 31 (out of 76), which is a respectable result for a non-urban unit. In practice, however,
future prospects for municipal electricity distribution in the South are bleak, due to traditional
ENEL incumbency resulting from Southern electrification being completed, upgraded, and
co-ordinated by ENEL itself in the early 1960s. On the contrary, non-urban Northern
electrification had already been provided by local firms during the first decades of this
century, prior to electricity nationalisation under ENEL (1962). To sum up, no one really
believes that a municipal electricity system could really develop in the Mezzogiorno, so as to
follow the pattern of those local structures which are traditionally present in the North and -
albeit to a lesser extent - Centre of Italy.
Finally, the relevant percentages of winning units are displayed in the following Table.
Table 4: MUNI/ENEL Efficiency Comparison (SFM3): Statistics of Interest
Percentage of MUNI winners 35.13%
Percentage of MUNI winners if no mountain villages in
Trentino/South Tyrol are considered
46.15%
Percentage of MUNI winners if Lombardy only is
onsidered
55.56%
Largest Winner Towns (MUNIs) Parma, Terni, Vercelli, Cremona, Trieste,
Sondrio
Winner in Metropolitan Areas (Rome, Milan, Turin) ENEL
4. DEA Outcomes from a MUNI-ENEL Pooled Sample (1994-1996)
This Section provides a cross-check of the Stochastic Frontier outcomes by means of the
increasingly used Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) technique, a linear-programming tool
described at length by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978), by Banker, Charnes, and Cooper
(1984), and – more recently – by Fried, Lovell, and Schmidt (eds., 1993).
The basic, American-style assumption regarding exogeneity of output does not hold for
Italy’s distributing units, which are not strictly compelled to provide customers with
whatever electricity amounts they need. Moreover, inputs can be reasonably thought of as
‘moderately’ fixed in the short run because of both stickiness in labour management and
political interference in capital investment. Therefore, output maximisation with fixed inputs
seemed to be the best starting option for our DEA computations. This gave rise to model
DEA22(OUT), featuring two outputs (electricity, customers) plus two inputs (labour,
                                                     
26 Note that Apulia is one of the most developed regions in the Mezzogiorno.27
capital/lines). Generally speaking, the comments made on stochastic-frontier results are still
valid after DEA. The Table in the Appendix clearly shows that the efficient ENEL-MUNI units
under SFE had their results confirmed in the vast majority of cases.
Output orientation was selected in the pooled analysis so as be consistent with
stochastic-frontier outcomes on the same mixed sample (model SFM3, a translog production
frontier with energy delivered as output, and kilometres of line and employees as inputs).
Moreover, variable returns to scale were assumed. The Table in the Appendix provides usual
comparisons of scores for three DEA models27 and model SFM3, developed in Section 3 and
featuring three environmental variables only.
In terms of notation, recall that the reported Table features ENEL’s units - chosen on the
basis of both geographic and economic proximity to their municipal counterparts - in block
capitals, whereas municipal utilities are in small letters (with a final M indicating
‘municipality’). If one looks at the comparative table of efficiency scores, it once again seems
that DEA and SFE outcomes are not dramatically different. Among 100% efficient units, DEA
often spotted municipalities that had been deemed efficient by the SFM3 model, too. It is
useful to recall from Section 3 that, even though a minority (slightly more than 35%) of
municipalities were found to be more efficient than their ENEL peers, the picture became
much less unbalanced (46%) after excluding non-significant mountain distributors in the
Trentino-South Tyrol region. After considering Lombardy only, the percentage of MUNIs
outscoring their ENEL comparators jumped from 46.15% to 55.6%. It would be interesting to
know whether such mixed conclusions are also confirmed by the DEA models being applied
to the 1994-1996 pooled sample. The most elegant way to possibly confirm that the national
monopolist is actually wrong when claiming that all municipalities are less efficient than
ENEL’s own local units is simply to test whether efficiency scores from model SFM3 are
statistically in agreement with at least one of the three DEA series presented in this Section. At
a first glance, the towns that even in DEA had their municipality outscoring ENEL are
Brunico (South Tyrol), Cremona (Lombardy), Gattinara (Piedmont), Parma (Emilia), Selvino
(Lombardy), Sondrio (Lombardy), Soresina (Lombardy), Terni (Umbria), Tirano (Lombardy),
Trieste (Venezia Giulia), Vercelli (Piedmont), and Vigo di Cadore (Veneto).
Obviously, such similarities between DEA and SFE should be statistically confirmed.
The Tables below provide batteries of descriptive statistics and comparison tests, which will
be commented on in detail throughout the following paragraphs.
                                                     
27 The three DEA models used are: DEA22OUT (two outputs and two inputs, output orientation), DEA1C
(total customers as the only output, plus two inputs), and DEA1Y (energy delivered as the only output,
plus two inputs).28
Table 5: Pooled Sample: Non-Parametric and Parametric Tests
Descriptive Statistics
Models N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
DEA1C 76 0.676018 0.226345 0.2296 1
DEA1Y 76 0.602 0.274529 0.1662 1
DEA22 76 0.713093 0.22532 0.261 1
SFM3 76 0.618842 0.205177 0.226 0.99
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
DEA1C DEA1Y DEA22 SFM3
K-S Z (Normal) 0.803 1.027 1.12 0.588
Z Prob (2-tailed) 0.539 0.242 0.162 0.88
K-S Z (Uniform) 1.376 1.467 1.902 0.895
Z Prob (2-tailed) 0.045 0.027 0.001 0.399
Parametric Paired-Samples t-tests
Pairs/Values DEA1C-SFM3 DEA1Y-SFM3 DEA22-SFM3
t-value 5.304 -0.649 6.405
Deg. Freed. 75 75 75
t-prob 0.000 0.518 0.00029
Non-Parametric Tests
Not appropriate.
Additional Cross-Checking (Paired-Samples Parametric t-tests)
Not needed.
K Related-Samples Tests
Tests Friedman Kendall's W Cochrane
Chi-Sq. Value 107.368 107.368 n/a
Deg. Freed. 3 3 n/a
Chi-Sq. Prob 0.000 0.000 n/a
From the one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, it appears that normality failed to be
rejected for all series, with uniformity being also accepted for SFM3. This allowed us to
perform standard parametric t-tests on paired samples, with no need for rank-order
procedures. The t-tests strongly rejected the null hypothesis of zero mean for the series of
differences between matched pairs of samples DEA1C-SFM3 and DEA22OUT-SFM3. On the
contrary, statistical agreement between DEA1Y and SFM3’s efficiency series strongly failed to
be rejected, with t’s probability standing at almost 52%. This basically confirms the
conclusions reached in Section 4 with regard to the relative efficiency of some Northern
(especially Lombard) MUNIs as compared to their ENEL counterparts. Therefore, the most
similar DEA model to SFM3 - which, once again, is the one featuring energy delivered as the
only output, in line with SFM3’s translog production equation – corroborates our previous
results. Even the remaining DEA models, however, confirmed that such town-based
municipal units as Terni, Parma, Vercelli, Cremona, Trieste, and semi-urban ones as Soresina,
Tirano, and Brunico managed to outperform their ENEL peers. Once more, the conclusion to
be drawn is that no generalisation is possible when comparing MUNIs to ENEL’s zones. It is
probably true that ENEL does better than small rural and mountain municipal utilities, but
sometimes in towns - and especially in the Milanese region - municipalities take the lead.
ENEL claims that all MUNIs are less efficient than its distributing local zones. Such
generalisation should be rejected, as all comparisons must be carried out on a strict case-by-
case basis.
Finally, we emphasise the fact that related-samples tests being performed on all series
from pooled sample analysis rejected any similarity, thus crediting the alternative hypothesis30
that at least two of the examined samples were actually telling the investigator different
things. As we saw, however, one out of three matches was actually successful in delivering
the same statistical information, and this was - not by chance - the pair which coupled the two
most similar specifications, i.e. one-output DEA (with energy as Y) vs. one-output SFE.
5. Policy-Making Suggestions and Regulatory Perspectives
The policy-making suggestions which might be put forward as a result of the work
carried out so far stem from the following couple of considerations:
(a) ENEL's econometric analysis showed that (1) non-exhausted economies of scale
were found at sample-mean values, and that (2) Northern dominance in efficiency terms
persisted even after allowing for exogenous handicaps (with some noticeable exceptions of
Southern non-default efficient units);
(b) statistical paired-samples testing and direct rank comparisons found no systematic
ENEL dominance over MUNIs: the case-by-case comparison approach was then proposed.
DEA comparisons failed to spot any statistically significant superiority of ENEL's units.
As regards point (a), given the results on scale economies it seems that town-based
electricity distribution is not optimal, as it does not allow firms to work at efficient scale.  In
fact, ENEL is not organised as a series of local distributors.  Its distributing ‘compartments’
are actually in the number of eight, and operate on an inter-regional basis.  The distribution
branches of  ENEL generally cover much larger areas than the British RECs do, and there are
reasons to believe that their size is incompatible with efficiency maximisation.  Something
intermediate might be sought by the electricity regulator when reforming Italy's electricity
distribution sector.  For instance, those municipalities which were found to be comparatively
more efficient might be granted permission to expand beyond city limits so as to reach for
optimal scale, while retaining - at the same time - their local nature28.  As regards scope
economies, it would be probably a good policy choice to keep medium and low-voltage
distribution together.  Moreover, sub-additivity of cost at local levels should be assumed as a
default condition, unless the reverse is proven.
Again on point (a), Northern dominance on efficiency grounds was robust to the
insertion of pro-Southern environmental variables.  Even though some Southern branches
managed to feature among the first 50 most efficient units, the majority of them failed to
deliver satisfactory results.  In policy-making terms, this could lead the regulator to seriously
re-consider the cross-subsidy issue between Northern and Southern ENEL distributing units.
In order to sustain national price uniformity in the energy industries, the Italian Government -
formerly, ENEL's only shareholder - has traditionally allowed massive cross-subsidies to be
directed towards ENEL's Southern branches over the years (either transferring profits from
Northern units, or raising funds out of general taxation schemes).  The present analysis shows
that, apart from rural Southern units, there is no strong reason to believe that such North-
South cross-subsidies should be maintained.  Of course, countryside and mountain units -
both from the North and South of Italy - should continue being subsidised in order for
universal service to be provided; yet, standard urban branches from the South should be
(yardstick) regulated in a similar fashion as should Northern areas.  On yardstick competition,
as Bogetoft (1994) notices, DEA techniques in particular might be viewed within a principal-
                                                     
28 Local distributors proved to be a sensible economic choice in some other European contexts, e.g. Scandinavia and
Switzerland.31
agent (regulator-regulatee) perspective, since DEA's output provides the investigator with
‘peer’ firms, i.e. those frontier-efficient units whose input-output mix is closest to that of the
relatively inefficient unit under examination.  By linking the DMU's performance target to the
input-output values which DEA reports for its 100% efficient peers, the energy regulator
might implement yardstick competition even in the absence of input price figures.
Furthermore, linear combinations of peers (so-called 'projected points' on the efficient
isoquant) might be constructed in order to compare the inefficient unit to its 'virtual' efficient
twin, thus linking regulatory targets to 'optimal' production mixes.  Of course, DEA's purely
deterministic nature is a major obstacle to ‘plain’ yardstick regulation of the kind shown
above.  However, after adjusting for peculiar features and allowing for measurement error -
which new stochastic-DEA models might do in the future - DEA will naturally lend itself to
practical yardstick regulation of geographically-separated local monopolies lying within the
public utility realm29.
As regards point (b), neither the econometric nor the linear programming analyses
managed to spot any statistically significant superiority of ENEL's local units over municipal
distributors (MUNIs) located in the North and Centre of Italy.  Lombard municipalities even
proved to fare better than ENEL local branches in five out of nine direct comparisons.  Paired-
samples statistical tests and DEA runs again spotted no significant efficiency differences
between ENEL units and MUNIs, thus failing to support ENEL's claims according to which
MUNIs should either be shut down, or be incorporated with the national monopolist's
distributing arm.  With reference to the ENEL-MUNI dispute (shut down MUNIs vs. allow
them to survive and - possibly - expand beyond municipal limits), case-by-case analysis is
called for, as no generalisation was suggested by the work carried out in this paper.  We
immediately put this into practice by sketching a tentative, crude table reporting those
MUNIs which could be granted expansion. Also notice that the MUNIs which systematically
outscored their ENEL comparators - according to all methodologies - are mainly from the
Northern plains (Po Valley) and, more precisely, from the Milanese region of Lombardy.
                                                     
29 Yardstick regulation typically applies to electricity, water, and gas distribution.32
Table 6. Relatively Efficient MUNIs (Candidate for Expansion).









Soresina Lombardia CREMONA, LODI
Tirano Lombardia SONDRIO, LECCO
Gattinara Piemonte VERCELLI,
BIELLA, VERBANIA
Selvino Lombardia BERGAMO EXT., BRENO
Vigo di Cadore Veneto BELLUNO, BASSANO d/G
As regards ENEL-MUNI comparisons, metropolitan areas cannot be unambiguously
classified. Moreover, because of self-evident environmental reasons, Alpine MUNIs from
North-Eastern districts should not be included in the comparison altogether.  We preferred
not to express any judgement on metropolitan areas either, because MUNIs and ENEL units
operating there (e.g., in Milan and Rome) are not fruitfully comparable. Differently from
medium-sized towns, metropolitan areas are very heterogeneous in that they feature separate
residential (often managed by MUNIs) and industrial (often operated by ENEL) districts,
which are much more integrated with each other - and usually served by the local MUNI - in
medium-sized towns.  Therefore, whereas MUNI-ENEL comparisons were - albeit imperfectly
- possible for the average city, their feasibility was seriously jeopardised with respect to
metropolitan areas due to the above-mentioned heterogeneity reasons.  Of course, limited
homogeneity is also encountered for smaller towns' MUNIs and surrounding ENEL zones
(which sometimes serve rural provincial districts), but the magnitude of this drawback is
probably more acceptable for small cities30.
                                                     
30 In other words, higher uniformity between urban and peripheral territories is assumed for medium-sized towns
as opposed to large conurbations, which seems to be a sensible hypothesis.33
To conclude, the regulatory perspectives stemming from this paper point towards:
(a) fewer cross-subsidies among ENEL's local distributing branches - maybe leading to a
revision of national price uniformity constraints on electricity distribution;
(b) feasible yardstick regulation as a consequence of DEA outcomes on efficient 'peers'
for each inefficient DMU under examination;
(c) case-by-case analysis of which MUNIs should be authorised to survive future
horizontal restructuring of electricity distribution, and which ones should - on the contrary -
be merged into ENEL's surrounding distributing branches.
As regards point (c), the whole discussion being carried out in the previous Sections
unambiguously rejected the feasibility of any generalisation with respect to the ongoing,
comparative efficiency dispute between ENEL's distribution zones and local municipal
administrations.34
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Numerical Appendix
Pooled Sample (1994-1996): DEA Efficiency Scores (DEA22OUT, DEA1C2,
DEA1Y2) as Compared to SFE Results (Model POOL3TE)
Unit SFM3 DEA22OUT DEA1C DEA1Y
ANCONA 0.712 0.7845 0.7845 0.6112
BASSANO 0.666 0.7725 0.731 0.752
BELLUNO 0.552 0.5825 0.5825 0.3639
BERGAMO EXT. 0.855 0.8987 0.8891 0.8375
BIELLA 0.56 0.7077 0.5692 0.7077
BOLOGNA 0.85 1 1 0.9939
BOLZANO 0.334 0.379 0.349 0.379
Bolzano (M) 0.241 0.261 0.261 0.2324
BOVISIO 0.899 0.9268 0.9268 0.8908
BRENO 0.533 0.5494 0.5494 0.5426
BRESCIA 0.706 1 0.7774 1
Brescia (M) 0.418 0.5643 0.523 0.5643
Bressanone (M) 0.295 0.2983 0.2983 0.2268
Brunico (M) 0.448 0.4412 0.4412 0.3174
BUSTO A. 0.855 0.9757 0.8942 0.9757
CORSICO 0.975 1 1 1
CREMONA 0.569 0.663 0.596 0.663
Cremona (M) 0.685 0.7112 0.7112 0.5181
Gattinara (M) 0.662 1 1 1
Imola (M) 0.44 0.4596 0.4505 0.4548
IMPERIA 0.717 0.7495 0.7495 0.332638
Laces (M) 0.226 0.2911 0.2296 0.2911
LECCO 0.797 0.8966 0.8045 0.8966
Levico Terme (M) 0.293 0.2905 0.2905 0.1662
LODI 0.721 0.7405 0.7405 0.5861
MACERATA 0.619 0.6523 0.6523 0.4043
MELZO 0.936 1 0.9715 1
Mezzolombardo (M) 0.412 0.962 0.4405 0.962
MILANO 0.977 1 1 1
MILANO EXT. 0.862 0.921 0.8839 0.921
Milano (M) 0.537 1 0.9595 1
MODENA 0.744 0.9906 0.834 0.9821
Modena (M) 0.432 0.455 0.455 0.4229
MONOPOLI 0.663 0.7207 0.7207 0.3746
MONZA 0.99 1 1 1
Osimo (M) 0.405 0.4102 0.4102 0.2264
PARMA 0.683 0.7556 0.7333 0.7428
Parma (M) 0.946 1 1 0.8767
PESARO 0.66 0.7225 0.7225 0.451
Primiero (M) 0.324 0.3606 0.3606 0.216
Rep. S. Marino (M) 0.297 0.3521 0.2994 0.3521
RIMINI 0.642 0.6537 0.6537 0.4706
Riva del Garda (M) 0.511 0.513 0.513 0.2997
ROMA 0.744 1 1 1
Roma (M) 0.495 1 1 1
Rovereto (M) 0.288 0.6323 0.3408 0.6323
SALO’ 0.687 0.7134 0.7134 0.6594
Sanremo (M) 0.468 0.4874 0.4874 0.2016
Selvino (M) 0.99 1 1 0.236239
Seregno (M) 0.61 0.6473 0.6473 0.5303
Silandro (M) 0.328 0.4026 0.3288 0.4026
SONDRIO 0.556 0.5593 0.5593 0.3873
Sondrio (M) 0.605 0.6923 0.6841 0.5877
Soresina (M) 0.99 1 1 0.4933
TERNI 0.433 0.4687 0.4687 0.3572
Terni (M) 0.976 1 1 1
Tione (M) 0.462 0.5358 0.4766 0.5166
Tirano (M) 0.599 0.591 0.591 0.2825
Tolentino (M) 0.471 0.462 0.462 0.3983
TORINO 0.886 0.9862 0.9862 0.9286
Torino (M) 0.476 0.8445 0.8445 0.7017
Trani (M) 0.664 0.7072 0.7072 0.2991
TRENTO 0.633 0.689 0.689 0.599
TRIESTE 0.481 0.5758 0.4844 0.5758
Trieste (M) 0.608 0.6118 0.6118 0.3045
VERBANIA 0.62 0.6357 0.6357 0.3607
VERCELLI 0.435 0.4695 0.4552 0.4675
Vercelli (M) 0.752 0.8519 0.8519 0.5307
Verona (M) 0.344 0.8126 0.4586 0.8126
VERONA NORD 0.692 0.7236 0.7236 0.5749
VERONA SUD 0.707 0.7884 0.7694 0.7639
VICENZA 0.693 1 0.7476 1
Vicenza (M) 0.547 0.6581 0.6581 0.4634
VIGEVANO 0.658 0.6771 0.6771 0.48
Vigo di Cadore (M) 0.937 1 1 1
Voghera (M) 0.548 0.5587 0.5587 0.1984